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Irreconcilable Differences:
Yet More Attitudinal Discrepancies
Between Death Penalty Opponents and
Proponents: A California Sample
Robert J. Robinson*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of death-qualification of juries' in capital punishment cases
remains both controversial and empirically rewarding. A 1984 issue of
Law and Human Behavio2 was largely devoted to this topic, and the
issue has been much-debated right up until the present. In recent
months, the execution of Robert Alton Harris in California, the first person to be executed in the state in over twenty-five years, has refocused
attention on the issue of the death penalty.
The research in this area, and therefore the attendant controversy, may

be divided into various thrusts. There have been vigorous debates over
whether juries which exclude death penalty opponents are more or less
likely to convict a criminal defendant or whether death penalty oppo-

* Assistant Professor, Harvard University;, Ph.D. Social Psychology, Stanford University;, M.A., University of Cape Town; B.A., University of Cape Town; B.Comm., University of Natal, Durban. Co-Director of Project on Psychological Processes in Negotiation, Harvard Program on Negotiation; Assistant Editor, INT'L J. OF CONFICr MGMT.
1. "Death-qualified" juries are juries that "exclude people who are unwilling to impose the death penalty." Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs.
Crime Controk Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAw & HUML BEHAV. 31, 31
(1984).
2. See Claudia L Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualiftcation on Juror's Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 53
(1984); Phoebe C. Ellsworth et aL, The Death-Qualified Jury and the Drfense qf Insanity, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (1984); Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 1; Joseph B.
Kadane, After Hovey: A Note on Taking Account of the Automatic Death Penalty Jurors, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 115 (1984).
3. See Rogers Elliot & Robert J. Robinson, Death Penalty Attitudes and the Ten-
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nents really "mean it" when they say they are against the death penalty.'
However, one of the most fundamental questions, upon which this Arti-

cle concentrates, concerns the differences in attitudes and values between "excludable" jurors, those who are opposed to the death penalty,
and "death-qualified" jurors. Research has shown death-qualified jurors to
be more concerned with crime control and less with due process than
excludables' and more likely to assume that the defendant is guilty be-

fore hearing any evidence presented.' Further, death-qualified jurors are
less likely to express regret over the prospect of a wrongful conviction.7
In general, death-qualified jurors deviate from excludables in their atti-

tudes concerning a variety of law enforcement issues.' The implication
of this research is that a jury so constituted must surely include a degree
of bias against the defendant which would be moderated by the inclusion
of excludable jurors. Other research has emphasized how the orientation
of the jurors toward the death penalty may bias the recall of the facts of
the case' or their amenability to arguments in mitigation. 0
The author's intention in this Article is to provide a look at a college
population, in particular those participants who would, by the

dency to Convict or Acquit, 15 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 389, 402-03 (1991) (finding no
correlation between the tendency to convict or acquit and juror position on the death
penalty).
4. See Robert J. Robinson, What Does "Unwilling" to Impose the Death Penalty
Mean Anyway? Another Look at Excludable Jurors, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 471, 475
(1993) (Although potential jurors may be reluctant to impose the death penalty, most
.appear to be willing to vote for the death penalty in certain instances.").
5. Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 1, at 46.
6. See, e.g., Cowan et al., supra note 2, at 55-59; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra
note 1, at 46.
7. See Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 1, at 42-45.
8. Cowan et al., supra note 2, at 55, 75; see Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, supra note 1,
at 47-48. See generally Phoebe C. Ellsworth, To Tell What We Know or Wait for
Godot?, 15 LAw & HuM. BEHAv. 77 (1991) (refuting Professor Elliott's claim that
excludables might bring unfair bias against the state to deliberations); Phoebe C.
Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close Examination
of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DEUNQ. 116 (1983) (examining public opinion about the death penalty and concluding that public opinion is too
uninformed to be useful to courts). The Elisworth & Ross study supports the Vidmar &
Ellsworth conclusion in their 1974 article. See Neil Vidmar & Phoebe C. Elsworth,
Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L Ray. 1245 (1974).
9. Cowan et al., supra note 2, at 76; see J.V. Roberts, Public Opinion and Capital
Punishment: The Effects of Attitudes Upon Memory, 26 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 283
(1984).
10. James Luginbuhl & Kathi Middendorf, Death Penalty Beliefs and Jurors' Responses to Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 12 Aw &
Huu. Bmauv. 263, 275-79 (1988) (culling juries of those who oppose the death penalty
prejudices the defendant's case because excludables are more likely to consider mitigating factors and less likely to consider aggravating ones).
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Witherspoon" criteria, be classified as excludables (death penalty opponents), and those who would be classified as includables (those who
would, as jurors, be willing under certain conditions, to impose the death
penalty). The Article first describes the demographic breakdown of each
group and then presents attitudinal data which again finds significant
differences between these two groups with regard to questions of crime
and punishment.'

11. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522-23 n.21, (1968). The Witherspoon test
has two distinct elements. The state may exclude death penalty opponents in a death
penalty case when one of the following is 'unmistakably clear":
(1) that [jurors] would automatically vote against the imposition of capital
punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the
trial of the case before them, or
(2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from
maling an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.
Id. (format altered).
Because the definition of excludables and includables has been extensively covered, it will suffice for the purposes of the Article to summarize that "excludables" are
those participants who indicate that they are opposed to the death penalty in all cases
and would obey the judge's instructions in the determination of guilt or innocence in a
capital punishment case. In contrast, "includables" are defined as those who are in
favor of the death penalty in certain cases and who also would follow the judge's
instructions. See Cowan et al., supra note 2, at 62-63 (listing the Witherspoon qualfying questions used in this study).
The Witherspoon test itself has been modified somewhat by subsequent Supreme
Court decisions. In Adams v. Texas, the Court eliminated the requirement that courts
must determine that potential jurors will certainly and automatically vote against the
death penalty. 448 U.S. 38, 45-47 (1980). Thus, the Court rejected the "automatically
vote against" and "unmistakably clear" language of Witherspoon. Id. In Wainwright v.
Witt, the Court affirmed its preference for the Adams test. 469 U.S. 412, 420-23 (1985).
More recently, the Supreme Court has recognized that a defendant also has a right to
challenge jurors for cause, based on the likelihood that jurors will automatically impose the death penalty on conviction. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
12. A Note from the Authort
The Article is written in the style favored by the American Psychological Association, and is part of a tradition of research commonly referred to as "Psychology and
Law". This approach utilizes the tools and techniques of social science research to
investigate the empirical "truth" of various legal positions and arguments. Much of this
research has received attention in recent years for dealing with issues like eyewitness
testimony, recovered memory syndrome, scientific jury selection, and, in this instance,
the death penalty.
Part of this research paradigm involves the use of advanced statistical techniques,
which analyze the quantitative data produced by such inquiries. It should be noted that
the findings of the tests in this article are explained in everyday English, but the test
results are also included for the statistically-minded. These tests are highly technical in
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Il.

METHOD

The general method followed with all participants was the same. As
part of their introductory psychology class requirement, students participated in an open "questionnaire day," where a number of experimenters
submitted unrelated paper-and-pencil tasks in a pre-collated package. All
participants received the basic Witherspoon questions early on in their
package. When additional information was collected (as described below), it was included in a separate questionnaire in a different typeface

toward the end of the package. The specific secondary questionnaires
used and the data obtained from them is discussed below.

m.

PAIrCIPANTS

Participants were obtained from Stanford University and San Jose
State University. All participants were recruited from introductory psychology classes and received class credit for their participation. Over
four years, seven different questionnaire administrations were performed,
yielding a total of 1829 participants.' The modal age of participants was

eighteen.
IV.

DEmOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWN

Based on the Witherspoon questions, 20.4% of the 1829 participants
were categorized as excludables, and 74.3% were categorized as

nature, and the reader who would like to know more about them should consult a
textbook dealing with descriptive and inferential statistics. However, for the present
purpose, there is an easy way to understand them: while the tests cited here (the ttest, the X' test, the Mann-Whitney), all perform different sorts of analyses, their results
are all expressed the same way--as a probability that the result found is nothing more
than random error (which is always present when a sample of people are polled). This
probability statistic is expressed as p, which is always a fraction of 1.00 (which represents certain error). In social science research, results which are more than
5%-.05--likely to be in error, are generally not accepted as being reliably significant
Thus, in this Article, the result X'(2)=14.41, p<.05, indicates that a XVtest was performed, resulting in a difference score of 14.41, which given the nature of data in this
case, was less than 596 likely to be a false result (hence p.05). Sometimes exact pvalues are available, as in the case a little further on in the article, where t(58)=2.65,
p=.01. Here a -test was performed, which yielded a difference value of 2.65, which in
this case, was only 1%(p=.01) likely to be a false finding.
13. Of these, 652 were from Stanford, and the balance, 1177, were from San Jose
State. Post-hoc analyses did not reveal any difference between the groups in terms of
their attitude toward the death penalty, or any of the dependent measures described
below. Thus, the distinction between the two schools is not mentioned hereinafter.
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includables." These proportions are entirely consistent with those reported by earlier authors.'
The demographics of the subjects were as follows: 4796 of the sample
was female, and 53% was male. Women were slightly more prone to be
excludables (22.6%) than men (20.696), but this difference did not prove
significant, X'(1)=.86, p=.354.
There were some noticeable differences in terms of ethnic identification. Among the sample, 48.5% categorized themselves as European in
origin, 29.4% as Asian, 8.996 as Latino/Hispanic, 7.4% as African-American,
4.7% as Native American, and 1.1% as Middle Eastern. Excluding the
Middle Eastern group, which was too small to analyze reliably, the following percentage of excludables was noted for each group, in ascending
order. Native Americans 14.3%, Asians 16.096, African-Americans 18.2%,
Europeans 21.1%, and Latino/Hispanics 36.4%, X(2)=14.41, p<.05. There
are two salient points about this result the relatively low rate of
excludables among Native Americans and Asians and the relatively high
rate among Latino/Hispanics.
Information on religion was gathered from only 431 participants. The
three largest groups, Catholics, Jews, and Protestants, did not show any
significant differences among one another on the question of the death
penalty, X 2(2)=.875, p=. 6 46, although Catholics tended to produce more
excludables (17.8%) than Protestants (13.6%). The Protestant group was
not broken down into various denominations. Therefore, religious groups
that oppose the death penalty, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Quakers,
were not distinguished from other Protestant groups.
Many socio-economic indicators were also gathered from participants,
including age, present income, anticipated future income, family class
(lower, middle, upper), and support for political party (Democrat/Republican). On none of these measures were there any significant
or even interesting differences between the two groups. When asked to
categorize their political orientation, however, excludables were more indined to indicate that they thought of themselves as liberal (3.61 on a 7point scale) than were includables (4.21), t(105)=2.13, p<.05. However,

14. 2.596 were categorized as "nullifiers," individuals who would not follow the
judge's instauctions with regard to reaching a verdict due to their opposition to the
death penalty, and 2.7% were categorized as "automatic death proponents" (ADPs),
individuals who would not follow the judge's instructions due to their support for the

death penalty. ADPs have been relatively under-researched and may include individuals
who have misread the questions. See Kadane, supra note 2.
15. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
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the most provocative differences between excludables and includables
was in the area of attitudes.
V.
A.

ATTITUDINAL MEASURES

Blackstone's Formula

"The legal philosopher Blackstone"8 once said that it was better that
10 guilty people go free, than one innocent person be wrongfully imprisoned. Many people feel that in today's modern society, this ratio (10
guilty : 1 innocent) is out of date. What would you say an appropriate
ratio should be, which would maximize social justice?" Participants then
filled in the blank on a line which read: "I think an appropriate modern
ratio to maximize social justice would be _
guilty people going free
for every one innocent person wrongfully imprisoned."
Both excludables and includables produced mean ratings greater than
Blackstone's benchmark of 10. However, excludables produced a mean
score (38.88) significantly higher than that of includables (25.20),
t(165)=2.20, p<.05. Thus, excludables appeared to be more concerned
with wrongfully convicting an innocent person than were includables.'7
B.

The Purpose of the Criminal JusticeSystem

A sample of 395 participants was presented with commonly cited
philosophical bases for a criminal justice system-rehabilitation, stigmatization, deterrence, restitution for victims, punishment, and incapacitation. The participants were asked to rank all six according to how important they thought each should be as the purpose of a criminal justice
system.
The two groups, excludables and includables, produced differing orders of priority. For excludables, the most important goal was deterrence, followed by incapacitation, rehabilitation, punishment, restitution
for victims, and stigmatization. For includables, the order was punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, restitution for victims,
and stigmatization. Analyzing the comparative ranking of each goal between the groups using the Mann-Whitney 8 procedure revealed that

16. 4 wjiLm BLACKSrONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 909 (Bernard C.

Gavit ed., 1941).
17. Robinson, supra note 4, at 472. It is worth noting that the scores for nullifiers
and ADPs reflected their respective positions. The mean for nullifiers was 42.02, and
the mean for ADPs was 7.00.
18. Mann-Whitney statistical tests compare median scores of groups. Russell
Korobldn & Chris Guthrle, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Exper-
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includables ranked punishment significantly higher than did excludables,
p<.05. Excludables, in turn, ranked rehabilitation significantly higher than
did includables, p<.05.
C.

Acceptability of an Insanity Defense

A subset of sixty participants was presented with the synopsis of a
murder case which had recently attracted a great deal of local media
attention. In one afternoon, the defendant had suddenly killed his wife,
daughters, mother-in-law, sister-in-law, and a co-worker, and had fled to
Mexico, from where he was later extradited. An insanity plea was entered. Participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale whether
they believed that an insanity plea might be a justified defense for this
particular defendant (1 = very justified, 7 = not at all justified).
Excludables (4.13) were significantly more inclined to find an insanity
defense plausible than were includables (5.38), t(58)=2.65, p=.O1. This
result supports the 1984 conclusions of Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan, and
Thompson.'
VI.

CONCLUSION

As indicated earlier, there were no differences in the present sample
between excludables and includables in terms of age, socio-economic
indicators, or political party support. There were slight tendencies for
more women and Catholics to be excludables, but these were non-significant trends. Latino/Hispanic participants were far more likely to be
excludables than were any other group, and Native Americans and
Asians were least likely to be excludables. Excludable participants rated
themselves as more liberal than did includables. Further, they were more
concerned with wrongfully convicting an innocent person, more interested in deterrence and less interested in punishment, and they were more
likely to accept an insanity defense than were includables.
In the present sample of California students, with the possible exception of Latinos/Hispanics, there is no evidence that excludables consti-

imental Approach, 93 MICH. L REV. 107, 122 n.67 (1994). Mann-Whitney tests "describe
the likelihood that the difference between the median scores of two experimental
groups is caused by random error." Id. See generally SIDNEY SIEGEL & N. JOHN CASTELLAN, JR., NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1988) (dis-

cussing nonparametrlc statistics).
19. See Ellsworth et aL, supra note 2, at 89-92.
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tute any kind of "cognizable" group in which the Supreme Court might
take an interest Excludables do, however, present as a group of individuals a liberal perspective, concerned with questions of fairness and
justice - indeed, apparently far more concerned about issues such as
the rights of the defendant than are their includable brethren. While the
question of what "kind" of jury, with what beliefs and attitudes, should
be allowed to decide guilt and innocence in a capital trial is best settled
by philosophers, it is difficult to imagine that the rights of defendants are
not in some way being compromised by the exclusion of this group of
potential jurors from trials in which the death penalty is a possibility.
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